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Biological Citizenship: 
The Science and Politics of Cherobyl-Exposed 
Populations 
ByAdriana Petryna* 
ABSTRACT 
In the transition out of socialism to market capitalism, bodies, populations, and cat- 
egories of citizenship have been reordered. The rational-technical management of 
groups affected by the Chernobyl disaster in Ukraine is a window into this contested 
process. Chemobyl exemplifies a moment when scientific knowability collapsed 
and new maps and categories of entitlement emerged. Older models of welfare rely 
on precise definitions situating citizens and their attributes on a cross-mesh of 
known categories upon which claims rights are based. Here one observes how am- 
biguities related to categorizing suffering created a political field in which a state, 
forms of citizenship, and informal economies were remade. 
INTRODUCTION 
"Common sense is what is left over when all the more articulated 
sorts of symbol systems have exhausted their tasks." 
-Clifford Geertz, Local Knowledge' 
This essay explores the forms of scientific cooperation and political management that 
emerged after the Cherobyl nuclear disaster of 1986. It is about how such manage- 
ments are interconnected with global flows of technology and their integration into 
state-building processes, new market strategies, and governance and citizenship in 
post-Soviet Ukraine. Together with such dynamics, the essay considers, through 
ethnographic example, how local claims of disease and health are refracted through 
such institutions, how the sociopolitical contexts in which scientific knowledge is 
made can influence particular courses of health and disease and outcomes of these 
conditions. The aim here is to articulate the circumstances through which communi- 
ties of "at-risk" populations come into being; to show how norms of citizenship are 
related to such circumstances; and to show how such norms propagate through every- 
day scientific understandings and practices related to institutions of medicine and law 
in Ukraine. A set of working relations informs or is at stake in the propagation of 
* Graduate Faculty of Political and Social Science, New School University, 65 Fifth Avenue, New 
York, NY 10003; petrynaa@newschool.edu. 
I thank the editors and reviewers of this volume for their helpful comments and suggestions. 
1 Clifford Geertz, Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology (New York, 
1983), 92. 
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individual claims of being at risk. They involve the sciences of global institutions and 
experts, national sciences and laws, local bureaucratic contingencies, and familial dy- 
namics of suffering. These relations are indeed "working" in the sense that they affect 
perceptions of the seriousness and scale of the disaster, claims to its continuing harm, 
and the scientific, economic, and political modes through which such harm is ad- 
dressed. How do different systems of modeling risk from Cherobyl affect people's 
capacities to reason politically? How might the choice of illness, rather than health, 
become a form of "common sense" expressive of these models? These questions are 
explored in a context in which science is inextricably connected to state-building 
processes, and market developments are quite productively intertwined, generating 
new institutions and social arrangements through which citizenship, experience, and 
ethics are being altered. 
My book, Life Exposed: Biological Citizens after Chernobyl, elucidates how sci- 
entific knowledge and Cherobyl-related suffering were tooled to access social equity 
in a harsh market transition. More generally, it showed that in this new state, science 
and politics were engaged in a constant process of exchange and mutual stabilization.2 
This essay builds on that material by showing how contested attempts to intervene 
and to quantify radiation risk shaped the nature of the postdamage legal and politi- 
cal regime. Viewed longitudinally, the Chemobyl aftermath exemplifies a process 
wherein scientific knowability collapses and new categories of entitlement emerge. 
Ambiguities related to categorizing suffering create a political field in which a state, 
forms of citizenship, and informal economies of health care and entitlement are re- 
made. This appropriation of suffering at all levels is one aspect of how images of 
suffering are becoming increasingly objectified in their legal, economic, and political 
dimensions.3 This essay is specifically concerned with how these objectifications be- 
come a form of common sense and are enacted by sufferers in ways that can intensify 
the political stakes of suffering and promote protection, as well as new kinds of vul- 
nerability, in domestic, scientific, and bureaucratic arenas. 
THE EVENT 
The Cherobyl nuclear reactor's Unit Four exploded in Ukraine on April 26, 1986. 
The damages from this disaster have been manifold, including immediate injury in the 
form of radiation burs and death to plant workers, damaged human immunities and 
high rates of thyroid cancer among resettled populations, and substantial soil and wa- 
terway contamination. Soviet reports attributed the cause of the disaster to a failed ex- 
periment. According to one official report, "The purpose of the experiment was to test 
the possibility of using the mechanical energy of the rotor in a turbo-generator cut off 
from steam supply to sustain the amounts of power requirements during a power fail- 
ure."4 Many of the reactor's safety systems were shut off for the duration of the ex- 
periment. A huge power surge occurred as technicians decreased power and shut off 
2 Adriana Petryna, Life Exposed: Biological Citizens After Chernobyl (Princeton, 2002). 
3 Arthur Kleinman and Joan Kleinman, "The Appeal of Experience; The Dismay of Images: Cul- 
tural Appropriations of Suffering in Our Times," Daedalus 125 (1999): 1-24. See also Veena Das, Crit- 
ical Events: An Anthropological Perspective on Contemporary India (Oxford, 1995). I use pseudo- 
nyms for the majority of people interviewed for this essay. Names that appear in scientific and legal 
print are in some cases actual. 4 See Soviet State Committee on the Utilization of Atomic Energy, Report to the IAEA (Vienna, 
1986), 16. 
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the steam. The unit exploded once at 1:23 A.M. and then again. Due to particular wind- 
pressure gradients that day and in the following weeks, the radioactive plume moved 
to an estimated height of eight kilometers. Subsequent attempts to extinguish the 
flames of the burning graphite core proved only partly successful. By most accounts, 
they even exacerbated the danger of the situation. For example, an attempt was made 
to suffocate the flames with tons of boron carbide, dolomite, sand, clay, and lead 
dropped from helicopters. As a result, the core's temperature increased. The cloud of 
radiation rose dramatically and moved across Belarus, Ukraine, Russia, Western Eu- 
rope, and other areas of the Northern Hemisphere.s 
An official announcement of the disaster came almost three weeks after the event. In 
that time, roughly 13,000 children in contaminated areas took in a dose of radiation to 
the thyroid that was more than two times the highest allowable dose for nuclear work- 
ers for a year.6 A massive onset of thyroid cancers in adults and children began appear- 
ing four years later. Had nonradioactive iodine pills been made available within the first 
week of the disaster, the onset of this disease could have been significantly reduced. So- 
viet administrators contradicted assessments of the scale of the plume made by English 
and American meteorological groups. The Soviets claimed the biomedical aspects of 
Chemobyl were under control. Dr. Angelina Guskova of the Institute of Biophysics in 
Moscow initially selected 237 victims to be airlifted to her institute's acute radiation 
sickness ward. Acute radiation syndrome (ARS) was diagnosed among 134 of them. 
The official death toll was set at 31 persons, most of them fire fighters or plant workers. 
The disaster continued, especially among the groups of workers who were recruited 
or went voluntarily to work at the disaster site. Among the hundreds of thousands of 
paid and unpaid laborers,7 work ranged from bulldozing polluted soil and dumping it 
in so-called radiation dumpsites (mohyl'nyky), to raking and shoveling pieces of the 
reactor core-radioactive graphite-that had dispersed over a vast area, to construct- 
ing fences around the reactor, to cutting down highly contaminated surrounding 
forests. By far the most dangerous work involved the adjacent reactor's roof. In one- 
minute intervals, workers (mainly military recruits) ran onto the roof, hurled radioac- 
tive debris over parapets into containers below with their shovels, and then left. Many 
of these volunteers called themselves "bio-robots"; their biologies were exploited 
"and then thrown out." Based on extensive interviews, some laborers felt trapped and 
unable to leave the disaster area; this sentiment was particularly felt by unpaid mili- 
tary recruits and local collective farmworkers recruited to do the most menial and dan- 
gerous of tasks. Some said they went gladly, believing their tripled salary more than 
compensated for their risk. However, it cannot be definitively said that money truly 
compensated them for the suffering that was to come. 
Five months after the disaster, a so-called sarcophagus (now simply called the Shel- 
ter) was built to contain the 216 tons of uranium and plutonium in the ruined reactor. 
At present, the power plant is decommissioned. Some fifteen thousand people con- 
duct maintenance work or service the Zone of Exclusion. Most of the exclusion zone 
is located in Ukraine. The zone circumscribes the disaster site and covers thirty kilo- 
meters in diameter. Zone entry is limited to the plant's workers. 
5 See Alexander Sich, "The Denial Syndrome (Efforts to Smother the Burning Nuclear Core at the 
Cherobyl Power Plant in 1986 Were Insufficient)," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 52 (1996): 38-40. 
6 See Yurii Shcherbak, "Ten Years of the Cherobyl Era," Scientific American, April 1996, 46. 7 Estimates vary from 600,000 to 800,000. These workers came from all over the Soviet Union. The 
labor pool, however, drew heavily from the Russian and Ukrainian populations. 
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Ukraine inherited the power plant and most of the Zone of Exclusion when inde- 
pendence was declared in 1991. The government announced new and ambitious stan- 
dards of safety. It focused its resources on stabilizing the crumbling Shelter, imple- 
menting norms of worker safety, decreasing the possibility of future fallout risk, and 
decommissioning all units of the Cherobyl plant. These acts were important from 
a foreign policy standpoint. Showing that it could adhere to strict safety standards, 
Ukraine became the recipient of European and American technical assistance, loans, 
and trading partnerships. The legacy of Chernobyl has been used as a means of sig- 
naling Ukraine's domestic and international legitimacy and staking territorial claims; 
and as a venue of governance and state building, social welfare, and corruption. 
Some maintenance workers lived in government-constructed housing units in Kyiv, 
the country's capital, sixty miles south of the disaster area. They work in the zone for 
two weeks and then return home for two weeks. I met one such worker in 1992, the 
first time I traveled to the country. He identified himself as a "sufferer," a legal classi- 
fication instituted in 1991 for Cherobyl-affected individuals. He complained about 
how little his compensation (about five U.S. dollars a month) was in relation to rising 
food prices.8 The man was in absolute despair, trapped because he had nowhere else 
to work. He said he had attempted to find employment elsewhere, but nobody would 
hire him on account of his bad health and work history. The man linked his suffering 
to first a precarious and dangerous Soviet management of the aftermath, and then a 
complex medical and legal apparatus he felt unable to navigate. He then showed me 
a work injury, a flap of skin that had puckered and formed a kind of ring just above his 
ankle. Direct contact with a source of ionizing radiation had apparently caused it. His 
sense of violation and loss were clear when he referred to himself as a "living dead," 
whose memory of who he was in a former life "is gone." 
In 2000, I interviewed the director of the Shelter complex. What I learned was that 
almost a decade after independence, worker protections, in spite of some improve- 
ments, were still deficient. The director told me that norms of radiation safety were 
inoperative. In a place of tremendous economic desperation, people competed for 
work in the Zone of Exclusion, where salaries were relatively high and steadily paid. 
Prospective workers engaged in a troubling cost-benefit assessment that went some- 
thing like this: if I work in the Zone, I lose my health. But I can send my son to law 
school. "Taking this risk is their individual problem. No one else is responsible for it," 
the director told me. He compared Ukraine's mode of enforcing safety standards with 
European modes and told me that the "value" of a dose exposure remained untallied 
in Ukraine. In Europe, such values are calculated on the basis of the rem-expenditures 
workers incur; international safety standards limit the amounts. Despite the existence 
of these international limitations, the director's comment suggests that norms of 
worker exposures are in fact being decided locally and within the constraints of a na- 
tional economy. In effect, he was revealing to me the extent to which workers' lives 
are undervalued by being overexposed (for much less pay). Yet however undervalued 
his workers' lives may be, they are still driven to work by a situation in which 
8 The karbovanets (Krb) was Ukraine's legal tender from 1992 to 1996. Exchange rates per US$1.00 
plunged between 1992 and 1993. In March 1992, the exchange rate was Krb640:$1. By March 1993, 
that rate had fallen to Krbl2,610:$1. Subsequent rates were as follows: 1994-KrblO4,200:US$1; 
1995-179,900:$1; 1996-188,700:$1. The hryvnia (Hm) replaced the karbovanets at Hml: 
KrblOO0,000 in September 1996. The exchange rates were as follows: 1997-Hml.84:US$1; 1998- 
2.04:$1; 1999-4.13:$1; 2000-5.44:$1. 
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economic forces are overwhelming. In such an environment, physical risks escalate 
and risky work is seen as acceptable and even normal. 
"As a result of all the compounding uncertainties in the factors involved," wrote 
Frank von Hippel, "our estimates of the long-term health consequences of the Cher- 
nobyl accident are uncertain even as to the order of magnitude."9 Indeed, available 
models of assessment could not account for the scope of the disaster. As the short his- 
tory of the disaster indicates, rational-technical responses and political administrations 
(both in the Soviet and Ukrainian periods) have been compounding factors in the medi- 
cal and welfare tragedy that now affects more than 3.5 million people in Ukraine alone. 
Contested scientific assessments of the disaster's extent and medical impact, the deci- 
sion to postpone public communication, and the economic impetus to work in the ex- 
clusion zone have made Cherobyl a tekhnohenna katastrofa (a technogenic catastro- 
phe). This is a term that was used among my informants, including people fighting for 
disability status, local physicians, and scientists. It suggests that not only radiation ex- 
posure but also political managements have produced new biological uncertainties. 
Ulrich Beck noted that Chemobyl was an "anthropological shock" in Western Eu- 
rope. The shock came from the fact that everyday knowledge proved useless in the 
face of this catastrophe, as did expert knowledge.10 This "collapse" of knowledge also 
occurred, but in another way, in the other Europe. Cherobyl was associated with the 
collapse of Soviet life in general. Knowledge about risk, how to deliver it, how to 
value it, became something of a political resource. In this disaster's wake a state, a so- 
ciety, and knowledge and experience of health have been reconfigured. 
In exploring this aftermath, I use a methodological approach that involves moving 
back and forth between vulnerable persons and the everyday bureaucracies and pro- 
cedures by which they express their desires, claims, and needs for protection and se- 
curity. Such an ethnographic mode of engagement is in itself meant to question the 
possibility of a linear account or an all-or-none moral or political solution to this com- 
plex reality. Instead, its dynamics are approached from a prismatic point of view to 
gain a broader perspective on the interests and values involved in particular claims and 
sites. 
EXPERIMENTAL MODELS AND ETHNOGRAPHIC METHODS 
Between 1992 and 1997, I conducted archival and field research in Ukraine, Russia, and 
the United States. In Ukraine, I worked with resettled families and radiation-exposed 
workers. I also carried out archival research in the country's new Chemobyl Ministry, the 
Health Ministry, and Parliamentary Commissions on Human Rights. I conducted inter- 
views with key scientific and political actors in Kyiv and Moscow, comparing scientific 
standards informing concepts of biological risk and safety in the Soviet and post-Soviet 
administrations of the aftermath. The very nature of the problem, that is, understanding 
the everyday lived aspects of the Chemobyl aftermath, led me to a number of different 
sites and challenges. One of those challenges involved understanding how scientific 
knowledge about radiation risk was being circulated, assimilated, or rejected at the vari- 
ous levels (international, national, and local) in which interventions were being made. 
9 Frank von Hippel, Citizen Scientist (New York, 1991), 235. 10 Ulrich Beck, "The Anthropological Shock: Chemobyl and the Contours of a Risk Society," Berke- 
ley Journal of Sociology 32 (1987): 153-65. 
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I examined claims about the scale of the disaster made by scientific experts affiliated with 
the International Atomic Energy Agency. I compared expert knowledge with that of basic 
scientists in U.S. radiation laboratories and learned about how radiobiologists went about 
evaluating radiobiological effects at the cellular and subcellular levels. 
As a consequence, I could better situate expert claims and their measures in the con- 
text of their laboratory production and testing. I soon discovered that there was a 
"black box" separating knowledge about the effects of low-dose radiation at the ani- 
mal (laboratory) level and human (field) level. The dose-effect curves for high doses 
of radiation were one to one and fairly straightforward. The same could not be said for 
ongoing exposures at low doses (a typical condition after Cherobyl). On the one 
hand, experts promoted their authority, based in part on their mastery of what com- 
posed appropriate evidence of Cherobyl-related injury. On the other hand, there was 
considerable disagreement at the laboratory level over what the terms for interpreting 
radiation-induced biological risk in human populations are. International experts' 
projections about the health effects of Chemobyl often contradicted people's lived 
sense of those effects. For Ukrainian scientists, the lack of consensus at the basic sci- 
ence level meant that the criteria of evaluation of injury were, in essence, contestable. 
Ukraine became a most compelling place to examine the relations between risk, 
rational-technical power, and the emergence of new populations. Indeed, a new politi- 
cal, economic, and moral arena had been thrown open owing to the absence of con- 
sistent evaluative criteria. During the period of my field research, the country saw the 
growth of a population claiming radiation exposure qualified them for some form of 
social protection. Social protections included cash subsidies, family allowances, free 
medical care and education, and pension benefits for sufferers and the disabled. This 
new population, named poterpili (sufferers), numbered 3.5 million and constituted 7 
percent of the population. A political economy of Cherobyl-related illnesses with 
new kinds of social categories and hierarchies of entitlement was emerging. An indi- 
vidual classified as "disabled" received the best entitlement package as compared 
with a mere "sufferer." Nonsufferers, that is, people outside the Cherobyl compen- 
sation system, had even less or no chance of receiving state social benefits. Scientific 
know-how became essential to the negotiation of everyday life and the maintenance 
of one's status in the Cherobyl system. One had to know one's dose and be able to 
relate it to one's symptoms and work experiences in the Zone of Exclusion. The ef- 
fectiveness of this knowledge determined the place one could occupy and how long 
one could occupy it in the system of management of Cherobyl populations. 
Today, approximately 8.9 percent of Ukraine is considered contaminated. On aver- 
age, 5 percent of its state budget is spent on Cherobyl-related expenses. This in- 
cludes costs related to the environmental cleanup and technical support of the de- 
stroyed reactor. The majority of funds (65 percent), however, are spent on social 
compensations and financial maintenance of the Cherobyl public health and scien- 
tific apparatus. Belarus was much more heavily affected than Ukraine. Nearly 23 per- 
cent of its territory is contaminated. Contrastively, Belarus expends much less than its 
southern neighbor does on affected populations; it has curbed its sum of Cherobyl 
claimants-as has Russia." Dr. Guskova, who oversees the Russian compensation 
1 In Russia, the number of people considered affected and compensable has been kept to a mini- 
mum and remains fairly stable (about 350,000, including 300,000 Zone of Exclusion laborers and 
50,000 resettled). 
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system for workers of nuclear installations, including Chemobyl, is a well-known 
critic of Ukraine's compensation system. She told me that Ukrainians were inflating 
their numbers of exposed persons, that their so-called invalids "didn't want to re- 
cover." She saw the illnesses of this group as a "struggle for power and material re- 
sources related to the disaster." 
In response to her former colleague's indictment, Dr. Angelina Ceanu, a neuro- 
physiologist and physician to Chernobyl victims in Kyiv, told me, "It is inconceiv- 
able that an organism of any kind is passive to its own destruction." Her response 
was based on evidence from experiments conducted by the Soviet radiobiologist 
V. L. Komarov. In one experiment conducted in the late 1950s, he observed that 
sleeping rats, without provocation, woke up when exposed to small amounts of 
ionizing radiation. From these examples one can begin to appreciate how compet- 
ing scientific models (animal vs. human; psychometric vs. biological; laboratory vs. 
field-based), financial agendas, and distinct moral attitudes regarding the need for 
scientific work in this arena were not simply at odds with each other. Their con- 
frontation opened up a novel social arena consisting of contested claims around ra- 
diation illness. Indeed, a number of civic organizations lobbying for the right to 
compensation for such illnesses evolved with the biomedical and political institu- 
tions promoting "safe living" in Ukraine. These so-calledfondy (funds) were con- 
duits of international charity and represented the concerns of exclusion zone work- 
ers and resettled persons living in Ukraine. These funds enjoyed tax-exempt status 
and with their numbers (more than 500 in 1996) established an informal economy 
of a variety of imported goods, including vehicles, drugs, and frozen and dry food- 
stuffs. In short, the Chernobyl aftermath became a prism of the troubled political- 
economic and social circumstances that typified the Ukrainian transition to a mar- 
ket economy. The production of scientific know-how, markets, and state formations 
were mutually embedded, generating new inequalities and opportunities in the re- 
definition of citizenship and ethics. 
This work is based on multiple lengthy research visits to various state, scientific, and 
domestic contexts during 1992-1995, fieldwork conducted during 1996-1997, and a 
follow-up visit in 2000. The Radiation Research Center, also known as Klinika, be- 
came a primary focus of the field research. The center was established in 1986 to mon- 
itor the health of zone laborers; shortly afterward it began providing similar services 
for resettled persons. Its national-level Medical-Labor Committee (Ekspertiza) com- 
prises scientists, physicians, and administrators who have the authority to diagnose ill- 
nesses as Cherobyl-related (there are twelve regional committees). Patients with ill- 
nesses diagnosed as such receive a document, the so-called Chernobyl tie, which 
qualifies bearers to receive compensation privileges as a result of their Chemobyl- 
related illnesses. By 1996, the center had become the site of intense scientific and 
legal disputes. I observed physicians, nurses, and patients as they negotiated over 
who should receive the tie. I looked into current research, particularly in the center's 
neurological division. I also carried out interviews with sixty middle-age male and 
female patients and reviewed their medical histories, their illness progressions, and 
their experiences in attempting to qualify for disability status. A significant aspect of 
my research focused on the daily lives of the clinic's male patients and their families. 
I was concerned with how their belonging to a political economy of illness displaced 
their self-perceptions and roles as breadwinners and paternal figures. I traced chang- 
ing experiences of lichnost', a Russian-Soviet model of personhood evidenced in a 
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person's work ethics and level of commitment o a collective of laborers,12 the effects 
such changes had on domestic life, and the techniques household members used to 
have their illnesses count in the rational-technical domain in which their futures came 
to be addressed. 
These anthropological concerns illustrate the extent to which definitions of health 
and illness are embedded within spheres of politics and economics and are almost 
always connected with dimensions that go beyond the immediate body, such as in- 
terpersonal and domestic relationships. Arthur Kleinman has elucidated the "social 
course" of illness.13 Other anthropologists, such as Veena Das and Nancy Scheper- 
Hughes, have been concerned with constructions of health as they indicate discrep- 
ancies in power, social position, and inequality, particularly as lived by marginal 
groups and individuals. Recent ethnographies of science have portrayed how, more 
and more, biomedical technologies play a key role in that constructedness. PET 
scans, genetically based diagnostics, and sonograms image biological facts and are 
therefore inseparable from the objects they recognize and remake as disease."4 So- 
cial problems, health problems, and the technologies that image them are also 
linked. Anthropologist Paul Farmer has shown how patterns of "structural violence" 
affect the construction and expansion of populations at risk for diseases. De- 
teriorating health care, limited treatments, and inequalities are worsened by struc- 
tural adjustment programs and have led to epidemics of preventable infectious 
diseases such as multidrug-resistant tuberculosis. Indeed, "social forces and pro- 
cesses come to be embodied as biological events."'5 In Ukraine, efforts to remedi- 
ate the health effects of Chernobyl have themselves contributed to social and bio- 
logical indeterminacy and novel formations of power. Radiation exposures and their 
unaccountability, bureaucratic interventions by the state and failures to intervene, 
the growth of clinical regimes, and harsh market changes intensified the course of 
illness and suffering. Thus in the Chernobyl aftermath, illness and health are en- 
gendered and made sense of within the technical and political domain in which they 
come to be addressed. 
CONSTRUCTED UNKNOWNS 
In what follows, I address some of the scientific elements that played a key role in 
measuring and delineating the scope of the disaster and defining remediation and com- 
pensation strategies. In this context, matters such as atmospheric dispersion maps, in- 
terational scientific cooperations, and local scientific responses, as well as people's 
involvement in bureaucratic and testing procedures, led up to what can be called a 
"technical and political course of illness." Examples of people's engagement with, and 
influence on, such courses will then be discussed. 
Most scientists today would agree that given the state of technology at the time of the 
disaster, specialists "did not know how to make an objective assessment of what had 
12 Oleg Kharkhordin, The Collective and the Individual in Russia: A Study of Practices (Berkeley, 
Calif., 1999). 
13 Arthur Kleinman, Social Origins of Distress and Disease (New Haven, Conn., 1986). 
14 Emily Martin, Flexible Bodies: Tracking Immunity in American Culture from the Days of Polio to 
the Age of AIDS (Boston, 1994); Rayna Rapp, Testing Women, Testing the Fetus: The Social Impact of 
Amniocentesis on America (New York, 1999); Joseph Dumit, Picturing Personhood: Brain Scans and 
Biomedical Identity (Princeton, N.J., 2004). 
15 Paul Farmer, Infections and Inequalities: The Modern Plagues (Berkeley, Calif., 1999), 5. 
257 
ADRIANA PETRYNA 
happened."16 Tom Sullivan, who until recently directed the Atmospheric Release Advi- 
sory Capability (ARAC) group at Lawrence Livermore Laboratory in Livermore, Cali- 
fornia, agrees with this general appraisal.17 Prior to the Cherobyl disaster, Sullivan's 
ARAC team had generated atmospheric dispersion models of the size and movement of 
nuclear plumes resulting from American and Chinese aboveground nuclear weapons 
tests and the Three Mile Island accident. "A 200 by 200 kilometer area had been suffi- 
cient to model prior radiation releases," he told me. "We did the imaging near the Cher- 
nobyl plant using this 200 kilometer square grid, but the grid was so saturated, I mean, 
you couldn't even make sense of it because every place had these enormously high ra- 
diation values.... Our codes were not preparedfor an event of this magnitude."' 
Soviet scientists, too, were unprepared, but they did not admit their ignorance. In 
an August 1986 meeting with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), they 
presented a crude analysis of the distribution of radiation in the Zone of Exclusion and 
in the Soviet Union: "assessments were made of the actual and future radiation doses 
received by the populations of towns, villages, and other inhabited places. As a result 
of these and other measures, it proved possible to keep exposures within the estab- 
lished limits."'9 
The issue at stake is the state's capacity to produce and use scientific knowledge and 
nonknowledge to maintain political order. Historian Loren Graham, for example, has 
written about how "false" sciences such as Lysenkoism, which denied the existence 
of the gene and advocated labor-intensive methods of accelerating crop yields, have 
been instrumental in shaping work psychology and social life in the socialist project.20 
The fact is that limited Soviet maps of Chemobyl helped to justify limited forms of 
dosimetric surveillance and resettlement actions. Nonknowledge became essential to 
the deployment of authoritative knowledge. High doses absorbed by at least 200,000 
workers during 1986-1987 were insufficiently documented. According to one bio- 
chemist, many of the cleanup workers "received 6-8 times the lethal dose of radia- 
tion."21 "They are alive," he told me. "They know that they didn't die. But they don't 
know how they survived." His statement speaks to the extent to which not only knowl- 
edge but also ignorance were constructed and used as state tools for maintaining pub- 
lic order. As science historian Robert Proctor tells us in his informative book on how 
politics shapes cancer science, ignorance "is not just a natural consequence of the ever 
shifting boundary between the known and the unknown." It is a "political conse- 
quence" of decisions concerning how to approach what could and should be done to 
mitigate danger or disease.22 
16 One Decade After Chernobyl (Vienna, 1996). 
17 ARAC is a national emergency response service for real-time assessment of incidents involving 
nuclear, chemical, biological, or natural hazardous material. 18 Sullivan's team offered technical assistance through a Swedish intermediary, but the offer was re- 
fused by Soviet administrators. 19 Soviet State Committee on the Utilization of Atomic Energy, The Accident at Cherobyl Nuclear 
Power Plant and Its Consequences. Information complied for the IAEA Expert's Meeting, Aug. 25- 
29, 1986, Vienna; Zhores Medvedev, The Legacy of Chernobyl (New York, 1990). 20 Loren Graham, What Have We Learned about Science and Technology from the Russian Experi- 
ence? (Stanford, Calif., 1998). 
21 Symptoms of acute radiation sickness begin at 200 rem. At 400 rem, bone marrow failure sets in. 
Lethal dose (LD100) is a dose exposure that causes 100 percent of the death of cells or the human. 
LD50/30 is a dose exposure that causes 50 percent of the death of cells or the human within thirty days. 22 Robert Proctor, Cancer Wars: How Politics Shapes What We Know and Don't Know about Can- 
cer (New York, 1995), 7. 
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Cherobyl also became a venue for unprecedented international scientific cooper- 
ation and human research. President Mikhail Gorbachev personally invited a team 
of American oncologists led by leukemia specialist Robert Gale (UCLA) to conduct 
experimental bone marrow transplantations upon individuals whose exposures were 
beyond the lethal limit and for whom these transplantations were deemed appro- 
priate. Additionally, 400 workers selected by Dr. Guskova and others received a 
genetically-engineered hematopoietic growth factor molecule (rhGM-CSF), thought 
to regenerate stem cell growth. Though the results of the transplantations and trial 
proved unsuccessful, the medical work on this cohort (and the objective indices cre- 
ated around them) helped consolidate an image of a biomedical crisis that was being 
successfully controlled by cutting-edge scientific applications. In an effort to allevi- 
ate the public's fear, Dr. Gale appeared on television and walked barefoot in the zone 
with one of his children. 
As this internationalization of science ensued, however, the physical management 
of contamination at the accident site was internalized-to the sphere of Soviet state 
control. One policy statement released by the Soviet Health Ministry at the height of 
these cooperations, for example, directed medical examiners in the Zone of Exclusion 
to "classify workers who have received a maximum dose as having "vegetovascular 
dystonia," that is, a kind of panic disorder, and a novel psychosocial disorder called 
"radiophobia" (or the fear of the biological influence of radiation). These categories 
were used to filter out the majority of disability claims.23 Substantial challenges to this 
Soviet management came from certain labor sectors in subsequent years. At the end 
of 1989 only 130 additional persons were granted disability; by 1990, 2,753 more 
cases had been considered, of which 50 percent were authorized on a neurological ba- 
sis. Levels of political influence of specific labor sectors are reflected in the order they 
received disability: coal miners, then Ministry of Internal Affairs workers (the police), 
and then Transport Ministry workers. These various labor groups would soon realize 
that in the Ukrainian management of Chernobyl, forms of political leveraging had to 
be coupled with medical-scientific know-how. 
Arguably, the new Ukrainian accounting of the Cherobyl unknown was part and 
parcel of the government's strategies for "knowledge-based" governance and social 
mobilization. In 1991 and in its first set of laws, the new parliament denounced the 
Soviet management of Chemobyl as "an act of genocide." The new nation-state 
viewed the disaster as (among other things) a key means for instituting domestic and 
international authority. Legislators assailed the Soviet standard for determining bio- 
logical risk to populations. The Soviets had established a high of 35 rem (a unit of ab- 
sorbed dose), spread over an individual's lifetime (understood as a standard seventy- 
year span), as the threshold of allowable radiation dose intakes. This threshold limited 
the scale of resettlement actions. Ukrainian law lowered the Soviet threshold dose to 
7 rem, comparable to what an average American would be exposed to in his or her life- 
time. In effect these lowered measures for safe living increased the size of the labor 
forces going to the exclusion zone (since workers had to work shorter amounts of time 
if they were to avoid exceeding the stricter dose standards). The measures also ex- 
panded territories considered contaminated. A significant new sector of the population 
23 In my interviews, I heard instances of workers mimicking symptoms of ARS (vomiting, for ex- 
ample). This shows the level of desperation on the part of some of them to receive permission to leave 
the zone. 
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would want to claim itself as part of a state-protected post-Soviet polity. A biophysi- 
cist responsible for conducting retrospective dose assays on resettlers told me: "Long 
lines of resettlers extended from our laboratory doors. It wasn't enough that they were 
evacuated to 'clean' areas. People got entangled in the category of victim, by law. 
They had unpredictable futures, and each of them wanted to know their dose." 
Statistics from the Ukrainian Ministry of Health gave evidence of the sharp increase 
in 1991 of zone workers, resettled persons and inhabitants of contaminated territories 
registering their disability, and the annual patterns of enrollment of this new popula- 
tion for which the state committed itself to care. The statistics also show that the 
sharpest increase in the clinical registration of illnesses occurred under the category 
"symptoms and other inadequately known states," Class 16 in the International Clas- 
sification of Disease, ICD 10 (see Figure 1). These states typically include afflictions 
such as personality changes, premature senility, and psychosis. 
Ukrainian claims to a sudden expansion of Chemobyl health effects became a tar- 
get of international skepticism. Ukrainian scientists were often rebuked for their "fail- 
ure to use modern epidemiological methods and criteria of causality and a reliable 
data system." As a World Bank consultant noted, "Right now virtually any disease is 
attributed to Chernobyl, and no effort is being made either to prove or disprove these 
claims that would satisfy standard epidemiological criteria of causality."24 For the 
government, however, one can argue that these new statistics became a kind of "moral 
science,"25 a resolute display of its intention to make visible the effects of the Soviet 
mismanagement of the disaster and to guarantee its own social legitimacy while keep- 
ing world attention on the Cherobyl risk. 
In this daily bureaucratic instantiation of Chernobyl, tensions among zone workers, 
resettled individuals and families, scientists, physicians, legislators, and civil servants 
intensified. Together, these groups became invested in a new social and moral contract 
between state and civil society, a contract guaranteeing them the right to know their 
levels of risk and to use legal means to obtain medical care and monitoring. The suf- 
ferers and their administrators were also supported by the nonsuffering citizens, who 
paid a 12 percent tax on their salaries to support compensations. The hybrid quality 
of this postsocialist state and social contract comes into view. On the one hand, the 
Ukrainian government rejected Western neoliberal prescriptions to downsize its social 
welfare domain; on the other hand, it presented itself as informed by the principles of 
a moder risk society. On the one hand, these Chernobyl laws allowed for unprece- 
dented civic organizing; on the other hand, they became distinct venues of corruption 
through which informal practices of providing or selling access to state privileges and 
protections (blat) expanded.26 
Ethnographic accounts have illustrated that postsocialism's future cannot be based 
in predictive models or treated as unproblematic flows toward free markets. Michael 
Burawoy and Katherine Verdery point to the links between the socialist and post- 
socialist worlds as well as growing dependencies between postsocialist state forma- 
tions and global economics. Such dependencies "have radically shifted the rules of 
the game, the parameters of action within which actors pursue their daily routines 
24 World Bank, Managing the Legacy of Chernobyl (Washington, D.C., 1994), 7:6. 
25 Ian Hacking, Taming of Chance (Cambridge, 1990). 
26 For an elaboration of the concept of blat, see Alena Ledeneva, Russia's Economy of Favours: Blat, 
Networking, and Informal Exchange (Cambridge, 1998). 
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Figure 1. Symptoms and Other Inadequately Known States (per 10,000) 
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
1.3 1.7 1.7 1.9 2.3 2.7 5.9 34.7 108.3 127.4 141.3 
SOURCE: Ministry of Statistics, Kyiv, Ukraine. 
and practices."27 Ethnographic methods are critical for elucidating such interrelated 
processes at local levels. This is particularly true with regard to assessing the deci- 
sions people make based on limited choices available to them and the informal as- 
pects of power that inform those decisions. 
Shifts in aggregate human conditions and the circumstances of citizenship are also 
at stake in these changing political and economic worlds. The principles of a "classi- 
cal citizenship" endow citizens with natural and legal rights protected as matters of 
birthright.28 Regardless of nationality, such protections were granted to all Ukrainian 
inhabitants when the country declared independence. Yet birthright remains an insuf- 
ficient guarantor of protection as the lives of inhabitants of some Ukrainian areas can- 
not be fully, or even partly, protected owing to long-term environmental challenges. 
For these inhabitants, the very concept of citizenship is charged with the superadded 
burden of survival. The acquisition and mastery of certain democratic forms related 
to openness, freedom of expression, and the right to information are primary goals to 
be sure. Yet populations are also negotiating for the even more basic goal of protec- 
tion (i.e., economic and social inclusion) using the constituent matters of life. Such 
negotiations expose certain patterns that are traceable elsewhere: the role of science 
in legitimating democratic institutions, increasingly limited access to health care and 
welfare as the capitalist trends take over, and the uneasy correlation of human rights 
with biological self-preservation. 
BIOLOGICAL CITIZENSHIP 
In Ukraine, where democratization is linked to a harsh market transition, the injured 
biology of a population has become the basis for social membership and for stak- 
ing claims to citizenship. Government-operated radiation research clinics and non- 
governmental organizations mediate an informal economy of illness and claims to a 
"biological citizenship"-a demand for, but limited access to, a form of social wel- 
fare based on medical, scientific, and legal criteria that recognize injury and compen- 
sate for it. These demands are being expressed in the context of losses of primary re- 
sources such as employment and state protections against inflation and a deterioration 
in legal-political categories. Struggles over limited medical resources and the factors 
that constitute a legitimate claim to citizenship are part of postsocialism's uncharted 
terrain. Against a stark and overwhelming order of insecurity, there are questions to 
be asked about how the value of another's life is being judged in this new political 
27 Michael Burawoy and Katherine Verdery, Uncertain Transition: Ethnographies of Change in the 
Postsocialist World (Lanham, Md., 1999), 2. 
28 Dominique Schnapper, "The European Debate on Citizenship," Daedalus 126 (1997): 201 
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economy, about the ability of scientific knowledge to politically empower those seek- 
ing to set that value relatively high, and about the kinds of rationalities and biomed- 
ical practices emerging with respect to novel social, economic, and somatic indeter- 
minacies. The indeterminacy of scientific knowledge about the afflictions people face 
and about the nature of nuclear catastrophe materializes here as both a curse and a 
source of leverage. Ambiguities related to the interpretation of radiation-related in- 
jury, together with their inextricable relations to the social and political uncertain- 
ties generated by Soviet interventions and current political-economic vulnerability, 
make the scope of the afflicted population in Ukraine and its claims to injury at once 
plausible, ironic, and catastrophic. 
One instance of how these scientific and political dynamics operated in the every- 
day: the country's eminent expert on matters related to the disaster, Symon Lavrov, 
was well-regarded internationally for having developed computerized fallout models 
and calculating population-wide doses in the post-Soviet period. He told me, how- 
ever, that "when a crying mother comes to my laboratory and asks me, Professor 
Lavrov, 'tell me what's wrong with my child?' I assign her a dose and say nothing 
more. I double it, as much as I can." The offer of a higher dose increased the likeli- 
hood that the mother would be able to secure social protection on account of her po- 
tentially sick child. Lavrov and the grieving mother were two of the many figures 
whose efforts I documented. The point is the following: the mother could offer her 
child a dose, a protective tie with the state, which is founded on a probability of sick- 
ness, a biological tie. What she could offer, perhaps the most precious thing she could 
offer her child in that context, is a specific knowledge, history, and category. The 
child's "exposure" and the knowledge that would make that exposure an empirical 
fact were not things to be repressed or denied (as had been tried in the Soviet model) 
but rather things to be made into a resource and then distributed through informal 
means. 
Specific cases illustrate how these economic and state processes, combined with the 
technical dynamics already described, have laid the groundwork for such "counter- 
politics."29 Citizens have come to depend on obtainable technologies and legal proce- 
dures to gain political recognition and admission to some form of welfare inclusion. 
Aware that they had fewer chances for finding employment and health in the new mar- 
ket economy, these citizens accounted for elements in their lives (measures, numbers, 
symptoms) that could be linked to a state, scientific, and bureaucratic history of mis- 
management and risk. The tighter the connection that could be drawn, the greater the 
chance of securing economic and social entitlement. This dimension of illness as 
counterpolitics uggests that sufferers are aware of the way politics shapes what they 
know and do not know about their illnesses and that they are put in a role of having to 
use these politics to curb further deteriorations of their health, which they see as re- 
sulting, in part, from a collapsing state health system and loss of adequate legal pro- 
tections. 
Probability in relation to radiation-related isease became a central resource for lo- 
cal scientific research. This play with probability was being projected back into na- 
ture, so to speak, through an intricate local science. Young neuropsychiatrists made 
the best of the inescapability of their political circumstances (they could not get visas 
29 Colin Gordon, "Government Rationality: An Introduction," in The Foucault Effect: Studies in 
Governmentality, ed. G. Burchell, C. Gordon, and P. Miller (Chicago, 1991), 5. 
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to leave the country) as they integrated international medical taxonomies into Soviet 
ones and developed classifications of mental and nervous disorders that in expert lit- 
eratures were considered far too low to make any significant biological contribution. 
For example, neuropsychiatrists were involved in a project designed to find and assess 
cases of mental retardation in children exposed in utero in the first year after the dis- 
aster. In the case of one such child, a limping nine-year-old boy, researchers and par- 
ents pooled their knowledge to reconstruct he child's disorder as having a radiation 
origin. Even though the boy's radiation dose was low, he was given the status of suf- 
ferer because of his mother's occupation-related exposure (she was an emergency 
doctor who elected to work in the zone until late in her pregnancy) and also because 
a PET scan did reveal a cerebral lesion that was never hypothesized as being related 
to anything other than radiation. (It could have been birth trauma.) As researchers con- 
structed a human research cohort, they were also constructing a destiny for the newly 
designated human research subjects. It was precisely the destiny the parents were in- 
tent on offering to this child-a biological citizenship. 
These radiation-related claims and practices constituted a form of work in this 
market transition. A clinical administrator concurred that claims to radiation illness 
among the Ukrainian population amounted to a form of "market compensation." He 
told me, "If people could improve their family budgets, there would be a lot less ill- 
ness. People are now oriented towards one thing. They believe that only through the 
constitution of illnesses, and particularly difficult illnesses, incurable ones, can they 
improve their family budgets." Administrators uch as he informed me that they 
should not to be "blamed too much" for fueling an informal economy of diagnoses 
and entitlements. Complicities could be found at every level, and the moral conflicts 
they entailed were publicly discussed. Another administrator who authenticated com- 
pensation claims told me illnesses had become a form of currency. "There are a lot 
of people out of work," he said. "People don't have enough money to eat. The state 
doesn't give medicines for free anymore. Drug stores are commercialized." He 
likened his work to that of a bank. "The diagnosis we write is money." 
The story of Anton and Halia (age forty-two in 1997) shows the ways such com- 
plicity functioned in the most personal arenas. The new institutions, procedures, and 
actors that were at work at the state level, at the research clinic, and at the level of civic 
organizations were making their way into the couple's kvartyra (apartment). Anton's 
identity as a worker, his sense of masculinity, and his role as a father and breadwinner 
were being violently dislocated and altered in the process. In 1986, the state recruited 
Anton to work for six months in the Zone of Exclusion, transporting bags of lead ox- 
ide, sand, and gravel to the reactor site. The bags were airlifted and deposited using 
helicopters. He had no idea how much radiation he absorbed during those six months. 
From 1991 on, Anton routinely passed through the clinical system, monitored like any 
"prospective" invalid. His symptoms mounted over time. He had chronic headaches, 
lost his short-term memory, exhibited antisocial behavior, developed a speech disor- 
der, and experienced seizures and impotence, as well as many other problems. Despite 
the growing number and intensity of his symptoms, his diagnosis did not "progress" 
from an initial listing as a "psycho-social" case. 
When I met Anton and his wife, Halia, they were trying to manage on a small pen- 
sion he received as a sufferer. Anton saw himself as bankrupt, morally as well as eco- 
nomically: "The state took my life away. Ripped me off, gone. What is there to be 
happy about? An honorable man cannot survive now. For what? For what? We had a 
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life. We had butter. We had milk. I can't buy an iron. Before I could buy fifty irons. 
The money was there. My wife's salary is less than the cost of one iron." He told 
me that he did not know "how to trade goods" or to sell petty goods on the market. 
His meager pension left Anton with few options. He found himself confronting the 
shameful option of breadwinning with his illness in the Cherobyl compensation sys- 
tem or facing poverty. Over time, and in a concerted effort to remove Anton's psy- 
chosocial label, the couple befriended a leader of a disabled workers' activist group in 
a clinic. Through him they met a neurologist who knew the director of the local medi- 
cal-labor committee. The couple hoped this individual would provide official support 
for Anton's claim of Cherobyl-related disability. 
The economic motives for these actions were clear. Yet it was difficult for me to see 
this man giving up everything he knew or thought about himself to prove that his dif- 
fused symptoms had an organic basis. Neurology was a key gateway to disability; 
neurological disorders were most ambiguous but most possible to prove using diag- 
nostic technologies, self-inducements, and bodily display. At each step, Anton was 
mentally breaking down; he fell into a pattern of abusive behavior. His legal-medical 
gamble-this gaining of life in the new market economy through illness-reflected 
the practices of an entire citizenry lacking money or the means of generating it. This 
approach has become common sense, in Clifford Geertz's words, or that which is "left 
over when all [the] more articulated sorts of symbol systems have exhausted their 
tasks."30 
When I returned in 2000 to Kyiv to conduct further research, I discovered that cur- 
rent democratic politicians, many of whom drafted the original compensation laws as 
sovereignty-minded nationalists, now saw the Cherobyl compensation system as a 
dire mistake that has "accidentally" reproduced a socialist-like population. Funds and 
activist groups were now supported by socialist and communist leaderships, who lob- 
bied for continued aid in an increasingly divided parliament. Meanwhile, international 
agencies such as the World Bank cited the Cherobyl social apparatus as a "dead 
weight" to Ukraine's less-than-ideal transition to a market economy. Bank officials 
were so ill-disposed toward the system that they made its quick extinction a condition 
of future loan contracting. The disappearance of this exposed population from the 
state's radar seems ever more likely. Once "protected" by a safety-conscious state, this 
exposed population is being left alone to their symptoms and social disarray. 
Opinions about how the state should address the fate of these Chemobyl victims 
also serve as a kind of barometer of the country's changing moral fabric. Rural in- 
habitants who normally received the least in terms of socialist redistribution tended to 
be sympathetic to the victims' struggles. Among inhabitants of Kyiv and other urban 
centers, there is a growing consensus that the invalids are "parasites of the state, dam- 
aging the economy, not paying taxes." Many youths who had been evacuated from the 
zone do not want to be associated with groups of sufferers as this association makes 
it more difficult for them to find employment. 
Cherobyl was a key political event, generating many effects, some of which have 
yet to be known; its truths have been made only partly known through estimates 
derived from experimental science. The immediate postindependence discourse 
in Ukraine centered on the "truth" of Cherobyl. Ukrainians tried to put their suffer- 
ing in perspective vis-a-vis the repressive model of science and state: the number of 
30 Geertz, Local Knowledge (cit. n. 1). 
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people who died, how the government deceived citizens about the scale of the disas- 
ter, how the maps of contamination were misrepresentative, and so on. As harsh mar- 
ket realities entered everyday life, this model of organizing suffering quickly gave 
way to a different kind of scientific and political negotiation, one which had directly 
to do with the maintenance, and indeed the remaking, of a postsocialist state and pop- 
ulation. 
If, at the level of the moder state, spheres of scientific production and politics are 
in a constant process of exchange and mutual stabilization, then what I have suggested 
here is that stabilization proves to be a much more difficult task. At stake in the Cher- 
nobyl aftermath is a distinctive postsocialist field of power-in-the-making that is us- 
ing science and scientific categories to establish the state's reach. Scientists and vic- 
tims are also establishing their own modes of knowledge related to injury as a means 
of negotiating public accountability, political power, and further state protections in 
the form of financial compensation and medical care. Biology becomes a resource in 
a multidimensional sense-versatile material through which the state and new popu- 
lations can be made to appear. This postsocialist field of power has specific physical, 
experiential, political, economic, and spatial aspects. It is about knowledge and con- 
structed ignorance, visibility and invisibility, inclusion and exclusion, probabilities 
and facts, and the parceling out of protection and welfare that do not fit predictive 
models. It is also about how individuals and populations become part of new cooper- 
ative regimes in scientific research and in local state-sponsored forms of human sub- 
jects protection. In this context, suffering is wholly appropriated and objectified in its 
legal, economic, and political dimensions. At the same time, these objectifications 
constitute a common sense that is enacted by sufferers themselves in ways that can 
promote protection as well as intensify new kinds of vulnerability in domestic, scien- 
tific, and bureaucratic spheres. 
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